It is a bad time, we are told, for criticism and theory. The New York Times declares that theory is dead and then attempts to drive a stake through its heart by dismissing its most brilliant practitioner, Jacques Derrida, as an "abstruse philosopher" whose popularity in American academia is a mystery.
1 Only one year earlier the New York Times performed a similar postmortem on the greatest critic of our time, Edward Said. The coincidence is worth pondering: an Algerian Jewish philosopher and a Palestinian Christian literary critic turned out to be the most influential figures in the American academic humanities in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Both were engaged intellectuals, not just in the promotion of their ethnic or political communities and constituencies but in the critique of the very intellectual movements they inspired: postcolonial and deconstructive criticism. Both were utopian, futuristic thinkers, urging on us the possibility of a radical mutation of human thought-for Said, a commitment to the beginnings of a democratic and unified nation of Israel/Palestine; for Derrida, a global vision of justice and democracy to come. Both were accused of being professors of terror, the favorite canard of the militant ignorance and stupidity that passes for thinking in some quarters of American culture today.
For Said, terrorism was an unavoidable and straightforwardly ideological issue. By writing as a Palestinian, by insisting on his concrete his- torical identity in solidarity with both the Palestinian diaspora and the people living under military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, Said subjected himself to the label and the stereotype of one of the most vilified, despised peoples on the planet. The word Palestinian has been rendered synonymous with terrorist in the American vernacular. As Said noted bitterly in one of his late essays, "Israel, Iraq, and the United States": "It is worth recalling that the word terrorist began to be employed systematically by Israel to describe any Palestinian act of resistance beginning in the mid1970s."
2 And this word has indeed been elevated into an idol of the mind in the past thirty years, a figure of exaggerated power and fantastic mutability, not to mention radical evil-a perfect foil to the equally radical goodness of its self-appointed opponents. Said would know how to appreciate the recent vote of the United States Senate to declare the West Bank and Gaza terrorist sanctuaries, 3 thus declaring the occupation legal by their lights and justifying even more ferocious interdictions in the everyday lives of innocent people under a regime of systematic state terrorism. The historical facts about terrorism-that yesterday's terrorist is tomorrow's leader of a liberation movement; that terror is an instrument of states as well as nongovernmental actors; that terrorism is rarely an act of madness, but of rational calculation; that the evil of terrorism is usually located in its means, rarely (if ever) its ends-all this is totally ignored by the moralisticposturing that passes for criticism of the phenomenon of terror as simply evil. Of course the murder of innocent people for political aims is morally reprehensible and ought to be condemned, whether it is done by Islamic fundamentalists on suicide missions or in the name of "collateral damage" resulting from high-altitude bombing of civilian populations where "suspected terrorists" might be located. Perpetrators of both these kinds of acts should be subjected to criminal prosecution in international courts, however, not peremptory assassinations and the so-called surgical strikes that kill the innocent along with the guilty.
In contrast to Said, Derrida approached the question of terrorism from the outside, focusing on its psycho-political structure from a position of relative detachment. Even though deconstruction has sometimes been regarded as a kind of intellectual terrorism (an issue that I will return to later) Derrida's own discussion of it, in his reflections on the attacks of 9/11, is remarkable for its almost clinical and analytic tone and for its emphasis on the fantasmatic, spectacular, and mediated character of terrorism: "the real 'terror,'" argues Derrida, "consisted of and, in fact, began by exposing and exploiting . . . the image of this terror by the target itself."
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Derrida was one of the principal inspirations for what I have called the pictorial turn in modern studies of culture and media. He is in many ways responsible for moving beyond the "linguistic turn" in the human sciences described by Richard Rorty toward a renewal of traditional disciplines such as aesthetics, iconology, and art history, and the emergence of new formations such as visual culture and the study of media, especially of the materiality of media, as well as its equally important immateriality-what Derrida called spectrality, the ghostly realm of imagination, fantasy, speculation-the subject of a "hauntology" that renders all things or objectsall "beings" in other words-uncanny. Derrida has always been, then, a primary source of inspiration for my own work as an iconologist, a scholar of images across the media. And never more so than in my current work, which has turned toward a peculiar nexus in the discourse of biopolitics, the convergence of terrorism with cloning as cultural icons of the principal techno-scientific anxieties of our time.
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The importance of terrorism and the so-called war on terror, which has replaced the cold war as the major global image of conflict in our time, scarcely needs demonstrating. Cloning likewise immediately elicits images of horror, raising the spectre of a revival of Nazi eugenics, a brave new world of engineered organisms, test-tube babies, mutants, replicants, and cyborgs, of reproduction without sexual difference. The figure of the clone itself, as a mindless, even headless repository of spare parts, the reduction of the human being to bare life, the "acephalic figure," as Jean Baudrillard puts it, all turn out to be handy images for the figure of the terrorist himself.
6 Terrorist and clone unite in the stereotype of the mindless automaton, an organism whose individuality has been eliminated, fit only for a suicide mission. Small wonder that the images of Palestinian suicide bombers cir- 7 There are many other reasons for thinking of cloning and terrorism together. There is the historical fact of their coincidence as political issues: on September 11, the lead story in the New York Times was (and had been for over two months) the controversy over stem-cell research and human cloning, which had occasioned the unveiling of President Bush's faith-based science policy. There is also a kind of metaphorical convergence in the sense that cloning, as a figure for indefinite duplication of a life-form, is somehow the most apt image of the process by which terrorist cells breed and clone themselves. The comparison of terrorism to a virus or cancer, of invisible sleeper cells hidden inside the body waiting to strike, and of course to the biblical predictions of plague and pestilence in the last days all converge with the prospect of literal bioterrorism to make this a potent and inevitable icon in the collective imagination.
Derrida provides a larger framework for the convergence of cloning and terror. In his interview with Giovanna Borradori shortly after 9/11, in discussing terror he turned to a biological metaphor, but one focused on the totality of the organism, namely, the immune system, in contrast to the figure of the clone, which is an image of individual soldiers or cells-the antibodies and antigens on the biopolitical battlefield. Derrida diagnosed the attacks of September 11 as "a distant effect of the Cold War," more precisely, of "a Cold War in the head," a global head cold that had now mutated in an "autoimmunitary process . . . that strange behavior where a living being, in quasi-suicidal fashion, 'itself ' works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against its 'own' immunity" (PTT, pp. 92, 94).
At first glance, this diagnosis of terrorism seems counterintuitive, perhaps even in bad taste. It seems to blame the victim, the United States and the global system of which it is the head, for bringing on the attacks or even for a quasi suicide. The image of autoimmunity would seem more strictly applicable to something like a military coup d'etat, in which the armed de- fenders of the external borders and the internal order, the army and the police, turn against the legitimately constituted government, attacking the legislature, the judiciary, and deposing the executive.
8 The terror attacks of September 11 came, we want to say, from outside the body politic, from far away places like the Middle East; it was an attack by aliens, by "foreign bodies" that had taken advantage of American hospitality to infiltrate our borders. Derrida's image of autoimmunity, and of the immune system more generally, seems to be stretched to the breaking point.
But, on reflection, the stretching of the metaphor seems to be exactly the point. The limits, borders, boundaries of the body (politic), its relations of inside/outside, friend/enemy, native/alien, literal/figurative are exactly what is in question in the metaphor of the immune system and in the new phenomenon of international terrorism, which is quite distinct from the terrorism of local resistance movements (Ireland, Palestine, Spain) focused on a definite territory. The United States is, as Derrida points out, not just a distinct body politic with its own determinate borders and identity; it is the "capital 'head' of world capital," the chief organ of a much larger, global body, the contemporary world system (PTT, p. 96). The attacks of September 11 were not merely on U.S. territory but on the World Trade Center, the symbolic Twin Towers (whose uncanny twinness or clonal character has been the subject of a great deal of commentary already; as Baudrillard notes, "The Twin Towers no longer had any façades, any faces . . . . as though architecture, like the system, was now merely a product of cloning, and of a changeless genetic code").
9 Like the boundaries of the world system, like globalization itself, the metaphor of the immune system stretches out to comprehend at least one dimension of the totality of the present historical reality.
In selecting the figure of autoimmunity as a tool for analyzing modern terrorism, Derrida chose an image with considerable surplus value, one whose immediate applicability is startling and that continues to resonate well beyond the use he makes of it. As Donna Haraway points out, "the immune system is both an iconic mythic object in high-technology culture and a subject of research and clinical practice of the first importance." 12. Hans Belting reminds me that this "bipolar image" also has a religious foundation in the concept of corpus Christi, the body of Christ, which is both the collective body of believers and the Eucharistic body consumed in the sacrament of the Eucharist. The same undecidable figure of part for whole, whole for part, synecdoche and reverse synecdoche operates in the Christological discourse.
13. Arthur M. Silverstein, A History of Immunology (San Diego, 1989), p. 1. 14. As Derrida puts it, "What is terrible about 'September 11' . . . is that we do not know what it is and so do not know how to describe, identify, or even name it" (PTT, p. 94).
is important to stress Haraway's insistence on the doubleness of the concept, its status as "iconic" on the one hand and as an indispensable research tool on the other. That is, we can try to resist the image as a mere metaphor, a loose analogy, but it keeps coming back to haunt us in the biological figures that are part of the ordinary language for describing terrorism and in the unavoidable language of biomedical research. Even more interesting is what I want to call the bipolar character of the entire foundational metaphor that Derrida's figure presumes, namely, the ancient figure of the body politic.
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This image, which invites us to see the collective, society, the nation, mankind, even all living things as one body, is reversible. That is, we find ourselves speaking, whether we want to or not, of the political body as well as the body politic.
12 And it turns out that the very notion of immunity as such is originally based in a sociopolitical discourse, not a biological one: "The Latin words immunitas and immunis have their origin in the legal concept of an exemption," a sense that returns in the notion of diplomatic immunity. 13 The whole theory of the immune system and the discipline of immunology is riddled with images drawn from the sociopolitical sphere-of invaders and defenders, hosts and parasites, natives and aliens, and of borders and identities that must be maintained. In asking us to see terror as autoimmunity, then, Derrida is bringing the metaphor home at the same time he sends it abroad, stretching it to the limits of the world. The effect of the bipolar image, then, is to produce a situation in which there is no literal meaning, nothing but the resonances between two images, one biomedical, the other political.
The impossibility of a literal meaning, of course, means that we literally do not know what we are talking about or what we are literally talking about.
14 We are caught in the circuit between two images, dancing in the alternating current between two realms of discourse. For Derrida, this admission of ignorance is crucial because the real politics of the autoimmunity metaphor, beyond its power to deconstruct all the easy, Manichean binary oppositions that have structured the war on terror, is the restaging of terrorism as a condition that needs to be thought through analytically, system-15. It must be said, however, that Derrida is far less interested in pursuing the metaphor of the immune system in its "proper" realm of immunology than I am. He does not privilege this notion, as he says, "out of some excessive biologistic or geneticist proclivity" (quoted in Rodolphe Gasché, "'In the Name of ically, and without moral tub-thumping, exactly as we would approach the diagnosis of a medical condition.
15 Even more far-reaching is the implication that "a mutation will have to take place" in our entire way of thinking about justice, democracy, sovereignty, globalization, military power, the relations of nation-states, the politics of friendship and enmity in order to address terrorism with any hope of an effective cure (PTT, p. 106). In other words, we have something to learn here. Preestablished certainties are exactly the wrong medicine.
But one clue is offered by the metaphor (and the literal operations) of the immune system itself. There are two systems in the human body that are capable of learning. One is the nervous system (to which we will return in a moment); the other is the immune system, which learns by clonal selection, the production of antibodies that mirror the invading antigens and bond with them, killing them. 16 The implications of this image are quite clear. The appropriate strategy for international terrorism is not war, but rational, open, public institutions of international justice. The war on terror is like pouring gasoline on a fire or (to maintain the biopolitical analogy) like massive, unfocused doses of radiation or surgical intervention, overreactive "treatments" that fail to discriminate the body from its attackers or even that stimulate the proliferation of pathogens. The fact that the war on terror has been accompanied by a measurable increase in the number of terrorist attacks (London, Madrid) and accelerated the recruitment of jihadists would, if viewed from a public health perspective, surely give us pause.
17 Overreactive tactics can actually breed new cancer cells that clone themselves more rapidly. (Cancer has an interesting relation to autoimmunity, since it is about the body's inability to recognize a destructive cell structure as alien. The cancer cells are the body's own cells; their DNA lineage is indistinguishable from the host body. So the immune system sleeps through the attack by the body's own cells). The best strategy is highly targeted and intelligent intelligence, coupled with judicious and judicial procedures, not the black-ops stormtroopers, private armies of independent 19. It was conjectured that the short gap between the first and second impact on the Twin Towers was calculated to maximize media coverage, since it was obvious that every video camera at the center of the global media system would be trained on the World Trade Center immediately after the initial strike.
contractors, and hooded torturers that have sprung from the Bush fantasyland of the war on terror, but infiltrators who can simulate the enemy, who speak his language, understand, sympathize-who can clone themselves as "friends" of the terrorists. In other words, to some extent this would involve shifting the responsibility for dealing with international terrorism to the Islamic world, to its internal traditions of justice, its social and political networks, its established, legitimate police and military forces, its tendencies to modernization and secularization, as well as its deep religious commitment to peace and justice. U.S. military power would be kept in reserve for emergencies, humanitarian crises, and other limited-scale interventions. Outright preemptive war, invasion, and occupation of a foreign country that had not attacked us would be pretty much out of the question. Military adventures in regime change, democratization at gunpoint, would be low on the agenda.
If we listen to it, then, our immune system is whispering hints to us. That is, it is passing on a lesson to the nervous system, which is the other bodily system that can learn from experience. Not only that, the nervous system can accelerate its learning process with self-conscious reflection, critique, the preservation of memory and history. Immunity is a form of cellular memory; the body learns by experience how to fight measles, and it doesn't forget. The most dangerous threat to the immune system, then, is amnesia, the forgetting of what it has learned: forgetting, for instance, that today's terrorists (al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden) were yesterday's allies, trained as antibodies against Soviet military power in Afghanistan; forgetting, even more dangerously, that yesterday's terrorists are almost invariably tomorrow's heroes of national liberation and that moral absolutes are not just useless but positively dangerous in any counterterrorist strategy.
Unfortunately, what Marshall McLuhan called the "central nervous system" of the social body, 18 what Derrida calls the "technoeconomic power of the media" (PTT, p. 108), has been traumatized by an image-the spectacle, the word, above all the number as enigmatic name: 9/11. This image, the spectacle of destruction of the Twin Towers, has been cloned repeatedly in the collective global nervous system. 19 The mediatizing of the event was, in fact, its whole point, as Derrida writes: What would "September 11" have been without television? . . . Maximum media coverage was in the common interest of the perpetrators of "September 11," the terrorists, and those who, in the name of the victims, wanted to declare "war on terrorism." . . . More than the destruction of the Twin Towers or the attack on the Pentagon, more than the killing of thousands of people, the real "terror" consisted of and, in fact, began by exposing and exploiting . . . the image of this terror by the target itself. [PTT, p. 108]
In short, the attack was not immediately on the immune system but on the nervous system. And it was carried out by a fabricated, produced image, an impression or spectacle staged for the world's cameras by the terrorists, exploited by a political faction to declare an indefinite state of emergency, of exemption-that is, immunity-from all the normal niceties of civil liberties and international law, not to mention from all the legitimate, wellestablished institutions of its own immune and nervous systems in the form of its own intelligence services, those diplomatic and military experts and scholars who actually know something about the nature of the threat. What has been called a "faith-based foreign policy" was the perfect twin of the spectre of a faith-based terror. One fanatic deserves, begets another, and Uncle Sam is cloned as Uncle Osama.
20 Serious medical research into human cloning is banned by a faith-based science policy at one with the faithbased foreign policy that clones terror by declaring a war on it.
When will it become clear that terrorism might be better framed as a public health issue, involving a grasp of biocultural systems and their ecologies? It is the "nervousness" of the nervous system that is producing the "autoimmunity" of the immune system. This is standard medical wisdom about the relation of these two systems. When the nervous system is in a state of panic, anxiety, depression, or, even worse, psychosis, generating hallucinations and paranoid fantasies, the immune system has a tendency to respond inappropriately as well. What is the cure? Derrida's answer may surprise those who write him off as an obscurantist or nihilist:
It is once again a question of the Enlightenment, that is, of access to Reason in a certain public space, though this time in conditions that technoscience and economic or telemedia globalization have thoroughly transformed. . . . If intellectuals, writers, scholars, professors, artists, and journalists do not, before all else, stand up together against such violence, their abdication will be at once irresponsible and suicidal. [PTT, p. 125] Derrida invoking the Enlightenment? This will only surprise those who forget that it was the Enlightenment and the Goddess of Reason that presided over the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. Reason is on the side of both terror and counterterror. This insight is crucial to the understanding of deconstruction as a rational operation, one that traces the fault lines in any system or structure.
Which leads us to a final thought on the image of autoimmunity that cannot be resisted any longer. Is it the case that deconstruction itself is a species of autoimmunity? That is, in purely textual terms, is the tendency of the law, of writing, of texts, and of any system or totality, whether political or institutional or cultural, to deconstruct at some point, whether or not a deconstructor comes along to hasten the process? Is this symptomatic of a hidden affinity between deconstruction and autoimmune disorders? Derrida places deconstruction on the side of justice, of the undeconstructible demand, desire, and need for some notion of a justice to come.
Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice. It is perhaps because law . . . is constructible, in a sense that goes beyond the opposition between convention and nature, it is perhaps insofar as it goes beyond this opposition that it is constructible and so deconstructible. 24. See Derrida's comment where he points out that "members of the Resistance were regularly treated as 'terrorists' by the Nazis and the Vichy collaborators" (PTT, p. 109).
There are some moments, however, when Derrida grants a bit more agency to the deconstructor:
When I was very young-and until quite recently-I used to project a film in my mind of someone who, by night, plants bombs on the railway: blowing up the enemy structure, planting the delayed-action device and then watching the explosion or at least hearing it from a distance. I see very well that this image, which translates a deep phantasmic compulsion, could be illustrated by deconstructive operations, which consist in planting discreetly, with a delayed-action mechanism, devices that all of a sudden put a transit route out of commission, making the enemy's movements more hazardous. But the friend, too, will have to live and think differently, know where he's going, tread lightly.
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How seriously are we to take this fantasy, drawn from the lore of the French Resistance heroically fighting the German occupation?
24 And is it unfair to see that it is precisely a form of terrorism? (That was certainly the word used by the Germans to denounce the Resistance.) I can imagine the cries of protest at the very suggestion that Derrida and deconstruction are in any sense aligned with terrorism, but I do not think that simple disavowal is going to be adequate. Terror has become so thoroughly reified and reduced to an ideological slogan, a synonym for absolute evil, that it has become impossible to think clearly about it. And, in fact, I think it even stymied the fabulous powers of the great deconstructor himself. Consider, for instance, Derrida's final remarks that allow him to condemn the terrorism of bin Laden, despite his acute awareness that state terrorism and systemic terrorism are rampant in the world system today:
What appears to me unacceptable in the "strategy" . . . of the "bin Laden effect" is not only the cruelty, the disregard for human life, the disrespect for law, for women, the use of what is worst in technocapitalist modernity for the purposes of religious fanaticism. No, it is, above all, the fact that such Middle East, would withdraw all its forces, military, economic, and political, making room for the revival of an Islamic kingdom of God, a caliphate in which justice (by their lights) would prevail and become identical with the law. We might not like this future, but there is no denying that it is a possible future, one we must find ways to prevent and one that has been made all the more likely by the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. Derrida's assertion that bin Ladenism has no future is thus, not just empirically wrong, but the projection of a nihilism, a hollowness onto the figure of the enemy that is precisely the operation that mystifies that figure as an idol of the mind, a hollow signifier to which any absolute can be attributed.
The second objection is drawn from Derrida's own account of revolutionary violence as that which simultaneously violates the law and inaugurates a new legal order in an act of founding violence. Derrida asks of these revolutionary tactics:
Can what we are doing here resemble a general strike or a revolution, with regard to models, structures but also modes of readability of political action? Is that what deconstruction is? Is it a general strike or a strategy of rupture? Yes and no. Yes, to the extent that it assumes the right to contest, and not only theoretically, constitutional protocols, the very charter that governs reading in our culture and especially in the academy. No, at least to the extent that it is in the academy that it has been developed (and let's not forget, if we do not wish to sink into ridicule and indecency, that we are comfortably installed here on Fifth Avenue-only a few blocks away from the inferno of injustice).
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Derrida's disclaimer strikes me as both a refreshing moment of realism, with a due sense of proportion, and at the same time a straightforward admission that, yes, deconstruction is strictly analogous to the upheaval of divine or mythic violence that erupts like a volcano within any system, whether textual or political, and that may lead on to a new order of reading or of legality and political order to come. But that order to come will, if I understand him correctly, never arrive as justice itself (though it will invoke a justice to come at every moment), but only as a new order of law, a new horizon of interpretation. That is why justice, like deconstruction, like autoimmunity, like divine violence and terror itself, are not regulative ideals or horizons of possibility that can be foreseen. They are precisely the impossible, the madness of the law, and the law of madness. This also makes them structurally, formally indistinguishable from the terror of the bin Ladens, even in its imputed lack of opening to futurity. The difference, in fact, is more like that of Benjamin's distinction between mythic violence, which is foundational and future-oriented-and linked to fascism-and the divine violence of the general strike, which is a near-bloodless deconstruction of a political system-perhaps a Velvet Revolution.
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The innocence, in the sense of academic harmlessness or nonviolence, of deconstruction, then, is the only thing that saves it from the charge of being structurally equivalent to autoimmunity and even terrorism. But to say this is not to accuse deconstruction of anything (except perhaps being a philosophical and critical project). It is rather to make terrorism accessible to thought in a new way, beyond the moral certainties and the acts of mythical violence known as the war on terror. The idea that one can implant a democracy to come by invading and occupying a country, sacrificing uncounted thousands of its citizens as collateral damage and holding elections in which the identity of candidates needs to be kept secret for security reasons is precisely an act of mythical violence, driven by a regulative ideal of formal democracy that is an obscene parody of the real thing, much less any democracy to come that is worthy of the name. It is fascism with a Christian face, an American face. Over three thousand precious souls died in the destruction of the World Trade Center, but over 100,000 equally precious souls have died as a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, according to the British medical journal Lancet. 27 Where is the memorial to them? This brings me back to our present horizon of possibilities and impossibilities, the state of criticism and theory after Said and Derrida. I've said that they are linked by their utopian sense of a democracy to come and an openness to possible/impossible futures such as a single democratic state known as Israel/Palestine. Said's secular sense of "beginnings" (as opposed to mythic "origins") is, I think, his parallel concept to Derrida's l'avenir.
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I want to conclude by linking them at the level of method as well, working against the grain of deconstruction as event, and thinking about ways that we might go on, if not strictly following rules, in continuing the project of deconstruction. I've argued elsewhere for a procedure in Said's critical practice I call secular divination, a Nietzschean sounding of the idols without destruction.
29 I've also described this as a pictorial turn, a swerve from lan-guage to the image, a move that I see as characteristic of Derrida's interest in writing-graphism, rather than linguistics and language, as system-and his frequent invocation of the imagination, fantasy, and spectrality as the third that comes unannounced, the stranger or guest who demands, if not unconditional hospitality (the right of residence), then at any rate a right of visitation.
A word on the subject of the various figures of appearing-image, morphe, eidos, and especially phantasm. It seems to me that if . . . we take the word 'phantasm' to mean that which weaves the universal and the individual together in the image, then we come right back to what we said earlier . . . about the 'coming before' of the other in the I, i.e. as phantasm. But I would not free myself so easily of phantoms, as some people all too often say they do ('it's nothing but a phantom'). I think that we are structured by the phantasmic, and in particular that we have a phantasmic relation to the other, and that the phantasmicity of this relation cannot be reduced, this pre-originary intervention of the other in me.
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If I read this correctly, Derrida is saying that the image can neither be created nor destroyed (though perhaps it can and must be deconstructed). It is the other in me, which must be embraced even as a figure of terror (I take this to be Derrida's sense of the risk involved in unconditional hospitality). It arrives, appears; it is a figure of appearing and itself an apparition, a double presence of absence, a metapicture. The law is what opposes the image, interdicts and prohibits it, and the first law of the Abrahamic religions, the peoples of the book, is the law against the making of graven images. The law can be shattered, as Moses shows in his rage at the appearance of the Golden Calf, but the calf cannot be deconstructed in that way. It must be melted down, annihilated, and then taken in, drunk by the rebellious Israelites. This drastic treatment is based in a recognition that the image cannot be destroyed; it comes back to life, appears again in a spectral form, in the eyes of Moses' own words, the vision conveyed by his narrative.
31
The idols of our time, the monumentalization of 9/11, the fetishistic concept of terrorism, the mythic cultural icon of immunity as homeland security, cannot be destroyed either. But they can be sounded, made to divulge their hollowness. They can be melted down and drunk, deconstructed, and subjected to a secular divination. This will have to do for now.
